Dr Sreoshi Sinha
Delhi : Recent events in Bangladesh have provoked strong emotional responses in India, including calls for military action and territorial assertions. While these reactions are understandable amid heightened tensions, they risk overlooking the deeper structural forces driving the unrest. A closer analysis of the timeline reveals that the violence is neither entirely spontaneous nor solely domestic.
Large-scale unrest erupted following the assassination attempt on Sharif Osman Hadi on December 12, 2025, in Dhaka. Hadi, a prominent youth leader and spokesperson for Inqilab Mancha, rose to prominence during the 2024 student uprising that ousted Sheikh Hasina. Known for his fierce criticism of India—where Hasina now resides in exile—as well as the interim government under Muhammad Yunus, Jamaat-e-Islami, the BNP, and the Awami League, Hadi positioned himself as an independent force with substantial popular backing and ambitions to contest upcoming elections. His emergence challenged entrenched interests across the political divide.
Analytically, the key question extends beyond identifying the perpetrators to understanding who benefits most from the fallout. The aftermath did not follow the pattern of typical political mobilisation for succession or electoral advantage. Instead, public anger swiftly pivoted to external scapegoating, with India emerging as the focal point of accusations—often alleging New Delhi’s involvement or sheltering of suspects.
Subsequent developments were revealing: protests escalated from symbolic actions against diplomatic sites to internal destruction, including arson attacks on major media outlets perceived as pro-India (such as Prothom Alo and The Daily Star), vandalism of cultural institutions, and assaults on Awami League-linked properties. These tactics align less with parties pursuing legitimate governance or electoral gains and more with efforts to sow systemic chaos.
This trajectory undermines claims that mainstream political parties orchestrated the turmoil. Reports indicate that even the BNP, historically critical of India, maintained back-channel communications with New Delhi during this period. The violence thus appears disconnected from standard inter-party rivalry.
A more compelling interpretation points to geopolitical disruption as the primary aim—not regime change, but sustained instability. Tactics such as manufactured outrage, rapid shifts in blame narratives, and the exploitation of identity-based grievances echo patterns seen in other regional crises, including in Pakistan, where similar approaches ultimately failed to secure lasting advantages.
India’s measured response—marked by restraint rather than immediate retaliation—should not be misconstrued as indecision. On the contrary, it demonstrates strategic foresight: reacting impulsively could validate and amplify the provocations engineered by external actors. In asymmetric scenarios of narrative warfare, overreaction often advances the manipulator’s goals.
The influence of opaque networks-operating through proxies, alliances, and information operations-remains a critical factor. Their objective appears less about Bangladesh’s internal politics and more about undermining India’s regional influence, moral standing, and composure.
Ultimately, the dilemma for India is not whether to ‘respond,’ but how to evade a meticulously laid snare. The loudest narratives are frequently the least authentic, and the most overt provocations often conceal broader intents.
In South Asia, true power struggles unfold not in cycles of public fury, but through subtle erosion of institutions, perceptions, and state resilience.
(The author has been a Senior Fellow at Counterterrorism, HQ, IDS)